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IN TBP UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v

:

SHAYNE EDWARD RHODES,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 8 90148-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for aggravated
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (Supp. 1989).
appeal

--

This Court has jurisdiction f

tah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(i

appeal is from a district co •

!

.

,i

ho,ir

the

(S~i: . 1989) because the
: .mindi case involving a

third degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1

Whether the trial

COUT

* .:-• -i . t= discretion in

denying defendant's motion for continuance to a liesubstitution of < msei on the morning <-f trial.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon whi^h the
relies are included

*** b..>dy of this brief.

;^

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated assault on April
12, 1988 (Record [hereinafter R.] at 4).

Trial for defendant was

originally set for September 13-15, 1988, as a second setting;
however, that setting was vacated at the request of defendant's
counsel because of a scheduling conflict (R. at 25-28).
Defendant was tried by jury on November 21-22, 1988, in the First
Judicial District Court, in and for Cache County, the Honorable
VeNoy Christoffersen, district judge, presiding, and was found
guilty as charged (R. at 30 and 50).
After a presentence investigation by the Department of
Adult Probation and Parole, Judge Christoffersen sentenced
defendant on December 27, 1988, to a term not to exceed five
years in the Utah State Prison, and ordered him to pay
restitution in the amount of $123,918.27, jointly and severally
with the codefendant in this case (R. at 53-56 and Pre-sentence
Investigation Report [hereinafter PSI] included in the record on
appeal).

Defendant filed a notice of appeal on January 23, 1989

(R. at 63) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Because defendant's only claim on appeal was that he
was denied the right to counsel, a statement of the facts
supporting the charge against defendant will not be given.
However, the trial transcript demonstrates that there was ample
evidence to support the jury's verdict.
On the day set for trial, defendant's retained counsel,
Arden W. Lauritzen, asked for a conference in chambers before the

trial commenced.

At that conference, Mr. Lauritzen informed the

trial court that defendant wished to address the court (Trial
transcript [hereinafter T.] at 1; a copy of the transcript pages
containing this conference is attached as Addendum A).

At that

conference, defendant told the trial court that he wanted a new
lawyer because he had been in jail for six months and felt that
Mr. Lauritzen had not made any motions to help defendant (T. at
1).

Defendant said that he had spoken to Gilbert Athay who had

told him to dismiss Mr. Lauritzen and tell the court that Mr.
Athay was not prepared to go to trial (T. at 1).
The trial judge commented that the day of trial was an
"inappropriate time" to decide to substitute counsel, and
defendant responded that he had decided to change counsel two
days after he got out of jail and that he had not spoken to his
counsel since he had been released (T. at 1).

According to the

presentence report which is in the record of this case, defendant
entered a plea of guilty to one count of misdemeanor assault in
an unrelated charge on May 23, 1988 (PSI at 16). After an
investigation by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole,
defendant was sentenced on June 10, 1988, to a term of six months
in the Cache County Jail (PSI at 19). Defendant served 158 days
and was released on November 15, 1988, having served the full
sentence on the misdemeanor with early release for good time (PSI
at 19). November 15, 1988 was the Tuesday before the Monday
trial date on the present charge. According to defendant's
statement to the court, his decision to change counsel would have
occurred on November 17, 1988, the Thursday before trial.

The trial court conducted a colloquy with defendant
asking why defendant had not acted sooner in retaining new
counsel; defendant replied only that he did something as "soon as
[he] got a chance" (T. at 2).

Defendant told the court that Mr.

Athay had contacted the judge's "secretary," but the court
reiterated that the judge had not been contacted by Mr. Athay (T.
at 2).

The court also invited more information from defendant

when the court said that defendant had not shown how Mr.
Lauritzen had been derelict in representing defendant (T. at 2).
Defendant said the record was devoid of anything that Mr.
Lauritzen had "done to help [defendant] out" (T. at 2).
Defendant complained that Mr. Lauritzen had not done anything to
try to get the charge reduced and said that counsel for the
codefendant had tried to get a reduction for the co-defendant (T.
at 2-3). In response to the court's question about the success
of codefendant's counsel, defendant admitted that they had been
unsuccessful in getting a reduction in charge (T. at 3).
Defendant then said that he did not feel that Mr. Lauritzen had
done or would do anything for him (T. at 3).
Based on defendant's generalized complaints about Mr.
Lauritzen and the timing of the request, the trial court
determined that the motion to continue the trial was only made
for purposes of delay and denied it (T. at 3).

The trial

proceeded with Mr. Lauritzen representing defendant.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court
to deny defendant's motion to continue trial when that motion was

not made until the morning of trial.

Defendant's request for

continuance was based on a desire to substitute counsel.

He had

been represented for seven months by retained counsel and did not
express any dissatisfaction with that counsel until the morning
of trial.

Defendant told the court that he had decided some four

days before trial that he was going to seek other counsel but did
not speak with substitute counsel until the Friday before the
Monday trial date.
When a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with his
counsel, the court must balance defendant's right to counsel with
the orderly procedures of the courts and the public's right to
prompt and efficient administration of justice.

Where, as here,

defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel does not rise to a
deprivation of his constitutional right to counsel, the trial
court does not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to
continue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE
TRIAL WHEN THE MOTION WAS MADE THE DAY OF
TRIAL AND DEFENDANT DID NOT GIVE LEGITIMATE
GROUNDS FOR THE CONTINUANCE.
The sole issue raised by defendant in this matter is
his claim that he was denied the right to counsel of his choice
which he claims is guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution and by article I, section 12 of the
Utah Constitution (Brief of Appellant [hereinafter Br. of App.]
at 3) (emphasis added).

Based on that claim, he argues that the

trial court erred by not "reasonably and non-suggestively"
questioning defendant about his dissatisfaction with Mr.
Lauritzen and not granting defendant's motion to continue trial
to allow defendant "to retain counsel of his choice" (Br. of App.
at 3) .
A.

Abuse of Discretion.

The principal issue for this Court to decide in this
matter is whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant's motion to continue trial for purposes of
substituting counsel.

In the context of a motion to continue

trial in order to secure the testimony of a codefendant after the
codefendant's trial, the Utah Supreme Court Sdid:
It is well established in Utah, as
elsewhere, that the granting of a continuance
is at the discretion of the trial judge,
whose decision will not be reversed by this
Court absent a clear abuse of that
discretion. State v. Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d
1093 (1975). Abuse may be found where a
party has made timely objections, given
necessary notice and made a reasonable effort
to have the trial date reset for good cause.
Griffiths v. Hammon, Utah, 560 P.2d 1375
(1977) .
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982) (emphasis
added).
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
a denial of a motion to continue to allow certain counsel to be
present at trial in Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
Slappy, counsel had been appointed for defendant.

In

Just before

trial, counsel had been hospitalized and another attorney from
the same public defenders office was substituted.

Defendant

objected, but the new attorney assured the court that he was

fully prepared to proceed with the trial, and the court denied
the motion to continue trial.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

had overturned the conviction resulting from the trial, stating
that defendant had "the right to a meaningful attorney-client
relationship."

j^d. a t 13 (emphasis omitted).

The Supreme Court

reversed the Court of Appeals, stating that the sixth amendment
guarantee of counsel did not include a right to a "meaningful
relationship" between defendant and counsel.

Rl. at 13-14.

On the issue of the trial court's discretion in matters
of continuance, the Court in Slappy also said:
Trial judges necessarily require a great deal
of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the
least of their problems is that of assembling
the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the
same place at the same time, and this burden
counsels against continuances except for
compelling reasons. Consequently, broad
discretion must be granted trial courts on
matters of continuances; only an unreasoning
and arbitrary "insistence upon
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable
request for delay" violates the right to the
assistance of counsel.
Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court found that

"it was far from an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance" in
that case because substitute counsel had assured that court that
he was prepared and ready for trial.

The Court also noted that

counsel had succeeded in getting a hung jury during defendant's
first trial, in the face of "undisputed and overwhelming evidence
of guilt."

Ri. at 12. By implication, substitute counsel's able

and effective representation of Slappy argued against an abuse of
discretion in the trial court's denial of a continuance.

See

also Unqar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) ("The matter of
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continuance is traditionally within the sound discretion of the
trial judge").
The application of this case law to the present case
will be discussed in the next subpoint.
B.

Right to Counsel.

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right . . . to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence."

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution

provides:

"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the

right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, . . . "
Neither provision provides defendant with the right to counsel of
his choice.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a situation similar to
the present case in State v. Doherty, 29 Utah 2d 320, 509 P.2d
351 (1973).

In Doherty, defendant had retained counsel to

represent him; after the commencement of trial, counsel had
requested permission to withdraw and moved for a continuance.
Counsel cited defendant's loss of confidence in counsel as reason
to withdraw.
proceeded.

The court denied both motions and the trial
Defendant sought reversal on the ground, inter alia,

that the court erred in denying his motion to continue and for
withdrawal of counsel.

As to this claim of error, the Utah

Supreme Court said:
[T]he record fails to show that the defendant
was not competently and adequately
represented throughout the trial by his
counsel and there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the court below abused its
discretion in failing to grant the
defendant's motion.

Doherty, 509 P.2d at 352 (footnote omitted).

Obviously, in the

balance between defendant's right to counsel and the court's
discretion in matters of continuance, the fact that defendant was
represented by competent counsel during trial must be given
proper weight.
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court dealt with a case
involving a defendant's request for appointment of private
counsel because he had no faith in the public defenders office.
In State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120 (Utah 1986), cert, denied,
Wulffenstein v. Utah, 484 U.S. 803 (1987), the Court reiterated
that "[a]n accused is entitled to employ counsel of his choice"
or to have counsel appointed if he is indigent; however, he was
not entitled to dismiss court-appointed counsel at will and
expect the court to appoint a new one. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d at
121.

The Court said:
The accused is entitled to the effective
assistance of a competent member of our bar
who is willing to identify with the interests
of the defendant and present the available
defenses. . . .

Id. at 121 (citations omitted).

The Utah Supreme Court found

that the trial court had not abused its discretion, "considering
counsel's willingness and ability and defendant's conjectured
excuses for rejection."

Ijd. at 121.

This Court addressed the question of whether a trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to appoint new counsel
for a dissatisfied defendant in State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

This case is cited by defendant in support

of his arguments but is factually different from the case now

before this Court.

In Pursifell, counsel had been appointed for

defendant, not retained; in addition, Pursifell did not ask for a
continuance to retain new counsel but asked the court to appoint
substitute counsel.

These differences between the Pursifell case

and the present case apply specifically to the duty-to-inquire
issue which defendant cites in his brief.
Certain basic premises to be followed in a request for
substitute counsel were given by this Court in Pursifell.
Typically, motions for substitute counsel
are less likely to be granted when they would
result in a significant delay or mistrial or
would otherwise impede the prompt
administration of justice. . . . Courts are
also aware of the propensity for manipulation
of the process by criminal defendants and
some have cautioned that "requests for
appointment of a new attorney on the eve of
trial should not become a vehicle for
achieving delay."
Id. at 273 (citations omitted).

With that background, this Court

then spoke of a trial court's duty in the case of appointed
counsel to inquire into the nature of the complaint if a
defendant has expressed dissatisfaction.
The distinction between the appointed counsel in
Pursifell and the retained counsel in the present case is
significant.

In cases such as Pursifell, the court has appointed

counsel for defendant, defendant has not chosen his own.

If a

defendant then expresses dissatisfaction with appointed counsel,
it is incumbent upon the trial court to inquire and determine
whether the defendant's relationship with his
or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to
the point that sound discretion requires
substitution or even to such an extent that
his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel
would be violated but for substitution.

Id. at 273.

In the circumstance of appointed counsel, the court

chose the counsel for a defendant and is obligated to assure that
the counsel which the court provided does not deny a defendant's
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.
On the other hand, as in the present case, defendant
has chosen and retained his own counsel.

If he becomes

dissatisfied with his counsel, he can retain other counsel.

In

the present case, the trial court did not deny defendant's right
to retain substitute counsel, the court merely refused to
continue the trial and release defendant's original counsel (T.
at 3). Had there been a quick setting of the trial in this
matter so that defendant had not been allowed sufficient time to
decide whether he was dissatisfied with Mr. Lauritzen's
representation, it may have been an abuse of discretion to deny
the continuance.

However, that was not the case.

document was filed on April 12, 1988 (R. at 4).

The charging

A notice of

preliminary hearing was issued on April 26, 1988, at which time
A. W. Lauritzen was listed as attorney for defendant (R. at 15).
On May 27, 1988, the public defender, Robert Gutke, was allowed
to withdraw, and Mr. Lauritzen was listed as counsel at the
preliminary hearing (R. at 16). Mr. Lauritzen represented
defendant at the arraignment on June 13, 1988, and sought the
vacation of a second setting for defendant's trial based on
scheduling conflicts (R. at 24-27).

Trial was set for, and

commenced, on November 21, 1988 (R. at 30). From April 26, when
Mr. Lauritzen was first listed as defendant's counsel, to
November 21, the date of trial, is a period of seven months.

If

Mr. Lauritzen had given defendant grounds to seek another
attorney, the substitution could have been effected much earlier
than the morning of trial.
After discussing a duty to inquire into reasons for
requesting new counsel, this Court in Pursifell addressed the
standard for determining when substitution of counsel is
mandated.

This Court said:
Substitution of counsel is mandatory when the
defendant has demonstrated good cause, such
as a conflict of interest, a complete
breakdown of communication, or an
irreconcilable conflict with his or her
attorney. . . . When a defendant is forced to
stand trial "with the assistance of an
attorney with whom he has become embroiled in
an irreconcilable conflict," he is deprived
of the "effective assistance of any counsel
whatsoever" and his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is violated.

Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 274 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
This Court went on to hold that the reasons for dissatisfaction
stated by Pursifell were "not so substantial as to rise to a
constitutional level."

Ld. at 274.

Pursifell, when asked the

basis for his dissatisfaction, mentioned that he had met with
counsel only once and that he had not received notice of a
discovery hearing.

The Court noted:

The charges against defendant and the
factual setting in which they arose would be
a matter of routine for an experienced
criminal defense attorney. Multiple
interviews might have given defendant more of
a sense that a committed advocate was
diligently working on his behalf, but would
not necessarily have furthered his cause.
Id. at 274, n. 2.

This Court affirmed Pursifell's convictions,

findings that his complaints were insubstantial, and that

[w]hile it might have been preferrable [sic]
to delve deeper into defendant's arguable
claim of inadequate preparation, the failure
to do so was neither a constitutional
violation nor an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 274.
The inquiry made in the Pursifell case was similar to
the one made in the present case.

The trial judge asked

defendant the reasons for his dissatisfaction with the counsel
which had represented him for seven months.

Defendant complained

that his attorney had not helped him because he had been in jail
for six months.

Given that defendant was in jail because of a

six month sentence on a totally separate assault charge, the
court properly concluded that that was not a valid complaint
about Mr. Lauritzen's representation (T. at 1).

Defendant's

second complaint was that attorneys for the codefendant had tried
to get charges reduced against the codefendant; defendant claimed
that Mr. Lauritzen had not made the same effort.

As the trial

court pointed out, the codefendant's attorneys had not been
successful in getting charges reduced (indeed, the codefendant
pled guilty as charged and testified for the State at defendant's
trial) (T. at 2-3 and 83-131).
As the court told defendant, Mr. Lauritzen was present
for trial and prepared to give defendant the help he needed (T.
at 2).

The trial record demonstrates that Mr. Lauritzen ably and

competently conducted a defense for defendant.

Given the

overwhelming evidence against defendant, Mr. Lauritzen presented
the best defense possible.

This capable representation of

defendant by Mr. Lauritzen confirms that defendant's right to the
assistance of counsel was not violated.
-13-

Cases from other jurisdictions also provide guidance in
determining whether the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to continue denied defendant a sixth amendment right.

As

the United States Supreme court said in Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932), "[i]t is hardly necessary to say that, the right
to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice."
U.S. at 53 (emphasis added).

Powell, 287

In Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3

(1954), the Court said:
A necessary corollary is that a defendant
must be given a reasonable opportunity to
employ and consult with counsel; otherwise,
the right to be heard by counsel would be of
little worth.
348 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added).

The trial court's obligation to

allow criminal defendants to retain counsel falls under a
reasonableness standard.

The court is not required to give a

defendant unlimited time to seek counsel.
The right to seek and retain counsel of one's choice is
not an unfettered right however.

In United Scates v. Nichols,

841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988), a case arising out of the
District Court of Utah, the court said:
But the right to choice of counsel is not
absolute. . . . A court may restrict a
defendant's choice when allowing the
defendant to be represented by a particular
attorney would adversely affect an important
public interest. . . . A court may not,
however, "arbitrarily refuse to allow the
defendant to retain the lawyer of his
choice."...
841 F.2d at 1502 (emphasis added).

Accord United States v.

Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 955-56 (10th Cir. 1987); Urquhart v.

Lqckhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984); United Statex v.
Maqee, 741 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1984); Rubio v. Estelle, 689
F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d
956, 958 (3rd Cir. 1986); United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207,
1211 (5th Cir. 1986) (The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee
defendants the right to counsel of their choice).

The Tenth

Circuit court in Nichols next addressed the denial of counsel of
choice by a court's refusal to grant a continuance requested to
provide new counsel.

In that instance

the court must balance a variety of factors,
including the government's interest in the
efficient administration of the trial and the
defendant's interest in preserving chosen
counsel, in deciding whether to grant a
continuance. . . . The trial court is
afforded broad discretion in deciding whether
to grant a continuance.
Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1504 (citations omitted).

The court

referred to two other federal cases which listed factors to be
weighed in determining whether a trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant the continuance.
The first case cited is United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d
1319 (9th Cir. 1987), in which the court said:
The constitutional right of a criminal
defendant to choose his own attorney,
however, is limited to the "fair opportunity"
to obtain counsel of his choice. . . . When a
criminal defendant's constitutional right to
secure counsel of his choice conflicts with
the trial judge's discretionary power to deny
continuances, the reviewing court must
balance several factors in determining
whether the trial court's conduct was "fair
and reasonable." . . .
827 F.2d at 1322 (footnote omitted).
listed those factors as
-15-

In a footnote the court

whether the continuance would inconvenience
witnesses, the court, counsel, or the
parties; whether other continuances have been
granted; whether legitimate reasons exist for
the delay; whether the delay is the
defendant's fault; and whether a denial would
prejudice the defendant.
Id.

at 1322, n. 2.
In the other case cited in Nichols, United States v.

Burton, 584 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert, denied, Burton v.
United States, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979), the federal circuit court
stated:
[T]he right to retain counsel of one's own
choice is not absolute. The right "cannot be
insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct
an orderly procedure in courts of justice,
and deprive such courts of the exercise of
their inherent powers to control the same."
The public has a strong interest in the
prompt, effective, and efficient
administration of justice; the public's
interest in the dispensation of justice that
is not unreasonably delayed has great force.
584 F.2d at 489 (footnotes omitted).

In analyzing the balance

between the defendant's right and the public's right, the court
listed some of the factors to consider as:
the length of the requested delay; whether
other continuances have been requested and
granted; the balanced convenience or
inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses,
counsel, and the court; whether the requested
delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether
it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived;
whether the defendant contributed to the
circumstance which gives rise to the request
for a continuance; whether the defendant has
other competent counsel prepared to try the
case, including the consideration of whether
the other counsel was retained as lead or
associate counsel; whether denying the
continuance will result in identifiable
prejudice to defendant's case, and if so,
whether this prejudice is of a material or
substantial nature; the complexity of the
_u_

case; and other relevant factors which may
appear in the context of any particular case.
Id. at 490-91 (footnotes omitted).

A similar list of factors is

given in State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 760 P.2d 1207, 1209
(Idaho App. 1988) .
Other state courts which have addressed the issue
reiterate that the sixth amendment right to counsel is not an
absolute right and "does not necessarily include the right to
counsel of one's own choosing."

Carman, 760 P.2d at 1209.

Accord State v. Dukes, 34 Ohio App.3d 263, 518 N.E.2d 28, 32
(Ohio App. 1986); State v. Sampley, 60 N.C. App. 493, 299 S.E.2d
460, 462 (N.C.App. 1983); People v. Jeffers, 233 Cal.Rptr. 692,
697, 188 Cal.App.3d 840 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1987); Harling v.
United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1104 (D.C.Ct.App. 1978); People v.
Blake,

164 Cal.Rptr. 480, 483, 105 Cal.App.3d 619, 624-25

(Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1980) ("a defendant who desires to retain his
own counsel is required to act with diligence and may not demand
a continuance if he is unjustifiably dilatory or if he
arbitrarily desires to substitute counsel at the time of the
trial").
In the present case, it is clear that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to
continue on the morning of trial.

Balancing the right of

defendant with the public's right to the efficient administration
of justice, the trial court acted fairly and reasonably.

Using

the factors cited in Burton, this Court can determine that the
trial court's decision was correct.

A previous request for

continuance (by requesting the vacation of an earlier second
-1 7-

setting) made by defendant was granted; the witnesses,
prospective jurors, counsel and the court were present and
prepared for trial; the reasons given by defendant for the delay
were insubstantial at best; the defendant was solely responsible
for the circumstance which gave rise to the request by not
seeking alternate counsel earlier; defendant had other competent
counsel present and ready to defend him; no identifiable
prejudice would result to defendant from the denial of the
continuance; the case was rather straightforward, without complex
facts; and defendant's original counsel was prepared to go
forward.
Defendant wanted new counsel but watted until the
morning of trial to inform the court of that fact,,

Original

counsel had served defendant for seven months, and defendant had
not earlier expressed any dissatisfaction.

Defendant's stated

grounds of complaint were negligible, consisting only of a
complaint that counsel had not kept defendant from serving a jail
term for an unrelated matter, and that counsel had not gotten a
reduction of his charge.

Such a reduction of charge was

obviously not forthcoming considering that the codefendant, who
in the testimony at trial demonstrated less culpability, was
unable to achieve a lesser charge.

These complaints did not show

good cause for a very belated request for continuance to allow
substitution of counsel.
This is not a case where defendant was denied the able
assistance of counsel at trial.

The denial of the continuance

did not leave defendant without counsel; he had the assistance of

competent counsel who presented the best defense possible given
the extensive evidence against defendant.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

5 ^ ^ day of February,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

1

PROCEEDINGS

2

(NOVEMBER 21, 1988.)

3

(CONFERENCE IN CHAMBERS.)

4

THE COURT:

THIS IS THE CASE 3710, CRIMINAL

5

CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH VERSUS TRACY VAL KENDRICK AND

6

SHAYNE EDWARD RHODES.

7

YOUR POSITION THAT YOU WANTED SOMETHING ON THE RECORD.

8
9

I BELIEVE, MR. LAURITZEN, IT WAS

MR. LAURITZEN:

WELL, MR. RHODES APPARENTLY

WANTS TO EXPRESS HIMSELF FOR THE COURT.

AND IT WAS

10

GENERALLY FELT BY COUNSEL IT SHOULD BE OUTSIDE THE JURY,

11

DEPENDING ON WHAT THE COURT'S RULING IS.

12

SHAYNE, IT'S YOUR TURN TO TALK.

13

MR. RHODES:

SO BASICALLY,

WELL, I FELT I NEEDED TO GET ME

14

A NEW LAWYER BECAUSE I WAS IN JAIL FOR SIX MONTHS.

15

DIDN'T MAKE ANY MOTIONS TO HELP ME.

AND I WENT DOWN TO

16

TALK TO LAWYERS DOWN IN SALT LAKE.

WENT AND TALKED TO

17

GILBERT ATHAY AND HE TOLD ME IT WOULD BE BETTER TO

18

DISMISS ARDEN,

19

HAVE ANY COUNSEL BECAUSE HE CAN'T —

20

TRY THE CASE.

21

ARDEN

AND COME UP TO YOU AND TELL YOU I DON'T

THE COURT:

HE'S ISN'T READY TO

THIS SEEMS TO BE PRETTY

22

INAPPROPRIATE TIME ON THE DAY OF TRIAL WITH A JURY OUT

23

HERE TO DECIDE YOU NOW NEED ANOTHER LAWYER.

24
25

MR. RHODES:
OUT OF JAIL.

I DECIDED TWO DAYS AFTER I GOT

I HADN'T TALKED TO ARDEN SINCE I GOT OUT.
1

1

I WENT AND TALKED TO HIM.

2

THE COURT:

WHY DIDN'T YOU DO SOMETHING ABOUT

4 I

MR. RHODES:

I DID AS SOON AS I GOT A CHANCE.

5

THE COURT:

YOU HAVEN'T DONE ANYTHING AS FAR

3

IT THEN?

6

AS THIS COURT IS CONCERNED.

7

ANOTHER COUNSELOR OR SHOW WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR PRESENT

8

COUNSEL.

9
10

MR. RHODES:

GILBERT ATHAY DID TRY TO CONTACT

YOU.

11
12

HAVE TO HAVE POSITION OF

THE COURT:

THE

OFFICE HAS NEVER BEEN

CONTACTED BY MR. ATHAY.

13

MR. RHODES:

14

THE COURT:

HE TALKED TO YOUR SECRETARY.
THE COURT HAS NEVER BEEN

15

CONTACTED BY HIM.

16

DELAY.

17

VERY EXCELLENT CRIMINAL ATTORNEY.

18

REASON TO SHOW WHY HE'S INCOMPETENT OR WHAT HE HASN'T

19

DONE.

20
21
22
23
24
25

THIS SEEMS TO BE JUST A METHOD OF

MR. LAURITZEN HAS A GOOD REPUTATION.

MR. RHODES:

HE IS A

YOU'VE GIVEN ME NO

WELL, THERE'S NOTHING ON MY

RECORD THAT HE HAS DONE TO HELP ME OUT.
THE COURT:
HERE'S THE TRIAL.

NOTHING HE'S DONE TO HELP YOU OUT?

WHEN YOU GET TO TRIAL IS WHEN YOU

NEED HIS HELP.
MR. RHODES: TRACY'S LAWYERS TRIED TO GET A
2

1
2
3
4 II
5
6

CHANGE OF CHARGE.

ARDEN DIDN'T DO NOTHING FOR ME.

THE COURT:

WERE THEY SUCCESSFUL IN DOING

ANYTHING LIKE THAT?
MR. RHODES:

NO, THEY WEREN'T.

BUT HE STILL

COULD HAVE TRIED.
THE COURT:

YOU COME IN AT THIS TIME OF TRIAL

7

AND SO THIS IS THE REASON YOU WANT TO CONTINUE, TO GET

8

ANOTHER ATTORNEY?

9

MR. RHODES:

I JUST DON'T FEEL HE'S DONE

10

ANYTHING FOR ME AND I DON'T FEEL HE WILL.

11

GOING IN HERE

12

I FEEL I'M

—

THE COURT:

YOUR PURPOSES AND YOUR ACTIONS

13

SPEAK A LOT LOUDER THAN WORDS.

THIS IS SIMPLY FOR THE

14

PURPOSE OF DELAY.

15

AND I WON'T RELEASE YOUR ATTORNEY.

I WILL DENY YOUR MOTION TO CONTINUE

16

MR. LAURITZEN:

17

MR. JENKINS:

ANYTHING ELSE.

I HAVE NOTHING.
FOR THE RECORD, DID YOU GUYS

18

RECEIVE THE MEMORANDUM DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR

19

BIFURCATION?

20
21

I'VE GOT A PREPARED ORDER OUT THERE.

MR. HAWKES:

MR. JENKINS:

23

THE COURT:

25

WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE

COURT'S CLERK I GUESS IT WAS DENIED.

22

24

BUT

ALL RIGHT.
IT DOESN'T PRECLUDE EACH OF YOU

FROM EACH HAVING YOUR OWN CHALLENGES, HOWEVER.
MR. JENKINS:

THEY ARE GOING TO ALL HAVE
3

DOUBLE CHALLENGES TO WHAT THE PROSECUTION HAS.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. JENKINS:

I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ELSE

RIGHT NOW.
THE COURT:

ANYBODY ELSE.

MR. LAURITZEN:

NOTHING.

4

